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Abstract 
 Punters may engage in betting  on  both  a selection in an event to finish first or in one of the 
number of places, e.g. 2nd, 3rd or 4th If the selection wins both the win and place (or show) parts of 
the wager will pay out.  If the selection places (or shows)  you lose the stake on win part of the 
wager  but receive a pay-out on the place or show part of the wager.  When the amounts staked 
with bookmakers at fixed odds on the win and place are equal it is called an each-way bet. Each-
way bets are apparently popular with punters but inconsistent with prominent models of wagering 
which assume gamblers are everywhere risk-seeking.  In this note we derive for the first time the 
conditions for win and place bets to be optimal in these three models of risky-choice and illustrate 
with numerical examples. The mathematical conditions for the each-way wager to be optimal, 
as opposed to a win and place wager with different stakes, are complicated and appear likely to 
occur rarely in practice. However bettors obviously see the attraction in giving themselves two 
ways to bet on the one horse, or two ways to win and betting each-way. From this perspective we 
suggest part of the "each way" betting attraction is that they are quick and easy to compute –a 
heuristic- to solve an otherwise complex betting strategy.  
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 Punters may engage in betting   on both a selection in an event to finish first or in one of 
the number of places, e.g. 2nd, 3rd or 4th.  If the selection wins both the win and place (or 
show)1 parts of the bet will pay out. If the selection places or shows, e.g. 2nd, 3rd or 4th, 
you lose the stake on win part of the bet but get paid out on the place or show part. When 
the win and place stakes are equal and the bet is placed with a bookmaker the wager is 
called an each-way bet. The place odds in an each-way bet are a quarter or a fifth of the 
win odds dependent upon the number of runners in the race and its type2. Each-way bets 
                                                          
1  In the US, a pari-mutuel wagering  system, if  you wager to place your horse must 
finish first or second for you to collect.  If you wager to show, your horse must finish 
first, second, or third. In both cases  you only collect the place or show payoff. 
 
2 Each-way terms for horse (and greyhound racing events) by bookmakers in  the UK, 
Australia and Ireland are settled on the actual number of runners that are deemed to have 
run in the race.  The odds are for handicaps of more than 16 runners - 1/4 odds on first 
four places.  Handicaps of 12-15 runners - 1/4 odds on first three places.  All other races 
of more than 8 runners - 1/5 odds on first three places. All races of 5-7 runners - 1/4 odds 
on the first two places. All races of less than 5 runners - place money goes on to win. 
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are apparently popular with punters according to Betfair and Internet postings3. This 
popularity accords with some early evidence of Johnson and Bruce (1998) based on a 
random sample of 1211 bets made with bookmakers in the UK. They reported that 349 or 
28.8% of the sample of bets were each-way bets. More recently Gainsbury and Russel 
(2015) describe the results of an analysis of 2,522,299 bets placed with an Australian 
online wagering operator over a 1-year period. Of the bets placed on horses (or 
greyhounds) there were 990814 win bets, 398767 each-way bet and 211469 place bets. 
Consequently of the total number of bets on horses 24.9% were each-way bets. 
Each-way bets offer punters a diversified wagering strategy. This popular wagering 
strategy is therefore inconsistent with a still prominent model of wagering that assumes 
the representative bettor exhibits everywhere risk-seeking preferences, (e.g. Weitzman 
(1965) and Quandt (1986)). In order  to offer an explanation of the popularity of each-
way  bets at actuarially unfair odds based on risky choice models it is therefore necessary 
to consider models in which individuals utility or value functions are assumed to exhibit 
risk-aversion. The non-expected utility models Rank Dependent Utility (RDU) of 
Quiggin (1993) and Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) of Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992) exhibit this property. In RDU an individual’s utility function is assumed 
everywhere risk-averse and in CPT an individual’s value function over gains is assumed 
everywhere risk-averse. In both of these models it is assumed that the representative 
agent’s subjective probabilities of an outcome differ from the objective probabilities via 
inverted s-shaped probability weighting functions. As a consequence a horse can exhibit 
                                                          




positive subjective expected returns and the representative punter can obtain positive 
expected value or expected utility from wagering on the horse to win in a race even 
though the odds are actuarially fair4. Given RDU and CPT can explain wagering on a 
horse to win at actuarially unfair odds we investigate for the first time the conditions for 
win and place or each-way bets to exhibit greater expected utility or value than the 
optimal single wager in these models. 
 We also consider the optimality of win and place wagers in standard expected utility 
with an every-where concave utility function. As is well known expected utility 
maximizers (EU) with an everywhere concave utility function defined over betting 
wealth will not wager at actuarially unfair odds. However professional gamblers, perhaps 
insiders, who might perceive a positive expected return to a unit bet, are often stated to 
employ the famous single Kelly wager (1956) which is derived for EU preferences 
assuming logarithmic utility5. The Kelly wager is also often employed to test models of 
efficiency in gambling markets. (See e.g. Lessman et al (2009)). Given these points it 
appears of interest to derive the optimal “Kelly” each-way wagers and compare it with 
                                                          
4  It is interesting to note  that Jullien and Salanié (2000), Snowberg and Walters (2010)  
and Fess et al (2016) report that CPT provides a parsimonious fit to horse racing data 
employing bookmaker data  on single bets in horse races  which exhibits the favorite –
long shot bias. The favorite–long shot  is a prominent feature of horse racing data where   
betting  odds  provide  biased estimates of the probability of a horse wining and  long 




the optimal single Kelly wager.  Standard EU is also a special case of RDU when 
probability distortion is assumed absent.  
Kelly wagers are based on logarithmic utility and for this reason we also employ 
logarithmic utility or value functions when analysing RDU and CPT. However our results 
are qualitatively the same with other specifications of the value or utility functions.  
Our analysis is new and demonstrates that win and place or each-way  
wagers can be an optimal wagering strategy. However we find that the formal conditions 
for an each-way wager to be optimal, as opposed to a win and place wager with different 
stakes, are very complicated and appear unlikely to occur in practice except by chance.  
One feature of win and place wagers is that punters have to form a subjective probability 
of the place probability.  This is a complicated process even for researchers in the area of 
testing market efficiency in gambling markets. The widely employed Harville place 
probabilities are based on formulae employing the win probabilities of each horse in the 
race. (See e.g. Harville (1973).  Stern (1987) develops alternative formulae employing 
running times based on gamma distributions. Lo and Bacon-Shone (1994) demonstrated 
that the Stern model provided a better fit than the Harville model for particular racing 
data but not in general. These formal mathematical methods of computing the place 
probability we presume will not in general be employed by the typical punter. However 
as documented above each-way bets are popular with punters. Bettors obviously see 
attraction in giving themselves two ways to bet on the one horse, or two ways to win. 
From this perspective perhaps a part of the "each way" betting attraction is that they are 
quick and easy to compute –a heuristic- a rule of thumb to solve an otherwise complex 
betting strategy. 
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The structure of the rest of the note is set out as follows. In section one we examine the 
optimal win and win and place stakes in standard expected utility. We then examine the 
same issue assuming RDU in section two and CPT in section three. The final section is a 
brief conclusion.  
Section 1 Expected Utility and Win and Place Bets  
With the assumption of log utility and betting wealth of one the expected utility, EU, of a 
single wager with bet size, j, of an expected utility maximiser is given by  
 
Where p is the objective win probability and a is the winning odds. 
Maximum expected utility is obtained from (1) when stake size is given by 
 
The optimal stake, j, in (2) is the famous Kelly stake. 
The expected utility of a win and place bet for an expected utility maximiser with 
logarithmic utility and betting wealth of one is given by 
 
 
Where p is the probability of coming first, q is the probability of coming 2nd, 3rd or 4th .  
The winning odds are a, the place odds b, s is the win stake and v the place stake.6  
                                                          
6 We assume for simplicity that the place odds are fixed at a constant value of b. However 








                                                                                             (2)
where  = pa - (1- p) is the expected return to a unit stake.
EU p ja p j    ln( ) ( ) ln( )1 1 1                                                                                         (1)
EU p sa vb q vb s p q s v          ln( ) ln( ) ( ) ln( )1 1 1 1                                           (3)
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Where    pa p( )1   and = (p + q)b - (1- p - q)  are respectively the expected returns to 
a single unit stake win bet and the expected return to a single unit stake place bet. If v>0 
and s>0 the second order condition for a maximum are met. 
From 4(a) and 4(b) we observe that it is not optimal to have a win and place bet unless 
the expected return to a unit stake single win bet,  , is greater than the expected return to 
a unit single place bet,  . In addition the expected return to unit stake of the place wager 
has to be positive and large enough so that a b .  
When these two conditions are met there are three possibilities. When s>v the punter will 
engage in a single win bet of size s-v and an each-way bet of size v.  When s=v the punter 
will have an each-way bet of size s. When v>s the punter would have an each-way bet 
with stake size s and a place bet of size v-s. We note that a win and place wager has a 
smaller expected return per unit staked than a win wager.  
It is interesting to examine the implications for relative stake sizes of the optimal each 
way wager and the optimal single win wager. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
odds are likely to be marginally less than b for the bet component, v-s.  Allowing for this 
complication implies optimal solutions for s and v that are very close to those given in the 
formulae in the paper though the formula is too long to include in the text. 
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Since we can define b
a
n
 , where n is the place proportion of the odds, we obtain 








       n = 4 or 5.                                                                                          (6) 










      n = 4 or 5.                                                                                                (7) 
It follows from (2) and (6) that the optimal “Kelly” each-way wager has a win component 
that is 4/5 or 5/6 of the optimal single “Kelly” wager. However from (2) and (7) the total 
stake of the each-way wager, s+v, is 1.6 or 1.67 times greater than the optimal single 
wager, j.  
As an example consider the case where a horse has odds of winning of a=33/1 with a win 
probability of p  3.2353(10-2 ) . This implies an expected return per unit staked of 
  01. .  The place probability q  8 0079 10 2. ( )  and the place odds b=33/4. This implies 
an expected return to a single place bet of   004. . The optimal win, s, and place stake, 
v, are both 2 4242. ).(10  -3 The optimal single win stake is j 3.0303(10-3).  Consequently 
the total stake in the each-way bet is 1.6 times greater than the optimal single wager. The 
expected utility of the each- way wager is 16497 10 4. ( ) and the expected utility of the 
optimal single wager is14685 10 4. ( ) . Consequently in this example the expected utility of 
the optimal each-way bet is 1.123 times greater than the optimal single wager.  
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Section 2 Rank Dependent Utility and Win and Place Bets 
In RDU of Quiggin (1993) individuals utility functions are assumed to have the same 
properties as in EU and are assumed everywhere risk-averse over betting wealth.  
In contrast to EU the objective probabilities of outcomes are replaced by subjective 
probabilities. It is assumed in RDU that the representative agent’s subjective probabilities 
of an outcome differ from the objective probabilities via an inverted s-shaped probability 
weighting functions. Quiggin assumed that subjective probabilities are greater (less) than 
objective probabilities when the objective probabilities are less (greater) than 0.5. 
Quiggin also assumed a cumulative weighting process (as subsequently assumed by 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992)) from which the subjective probabilities, or decision 
weights, associated with each of the outcomes in a lottery are derived. In the cumulative 
process Quiggin assumed the worst outcome is weighted first7. The subjective probability 
distortion can imply subjective positive expected returns to single bets on long shots and 
therefore positive expected utility to a single win bet8.  
To illustrate the implications of RDU for a win and place or each-way wagers we assume 
logarithmic utility so that in the absence of probability distortion our results will simplify 
to the results obtained in section one for the standard expected utility maximiser.   For 
simplicity we retain the same definitions of variables as in section one. Assuming betting 
wealth of one expected utility for a single optimal wager is given by  
                                                          
7 This differs from CPT where outcomes are weighted  from best to worst. 
8 Recent research by Harrison and Swarthout (2016) also demonstrates that RDU can 




Where w (1-p) is the probability weighting function. 
The optimal stake is given by  
j




   

[ ( )] ( )1 1 1 
                                                                                    (9) 
Where s w p a w p    [ ( )] ( )1 1 1  is the subjective return to a unit stake win bet. 
 
Assuming betting wealth of one the expected utility of a win and place bet is given by 
 
Where w(1-p-q) and w(1-p) are probability weighting functions and the probability 
weights are given by the cumulative weighting process assumed by Quiggin (1982). 
Other variables are defined as in EU for ease of interpretation. 
From the first order conditions for a maximum we derive that the optimal stakes for the 
win and place bet in RDU are given by 
 s
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where w p a w ps     [ ( )] ( )1 1 1  is the subjective expected return to a unit stake on a 
win bet and s w p q w p q      [ ( )]b ( )1 1 1  is the subjective expected return to a 
EU w p ja w p j      ( ) ln( ) [ ( )]ln( )1 1 1 1 1                                                            (8)
EU w p q s v w p w p q vb s
w p sa vb
           
    
( ) ln( ) [ ( ) ( )]ln( )
{ ( )]ln( )
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1
                         (10)
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unit stake on a place only wager. We observe from (11a) and (11b) that in the absence of 
probability distortion the optimal stakes are the same as for the standard expected utility 
maximiser with logarithmic utility given in 4(a) and 4(b).i  
We now provide an example to illustrate that the RDU agent can optimally wager each-
way when the winning odds for horses exhibit a favorite long-shot bias. A favorite long-
shot bias implies long shots have much lower expected returns to a unit stake than more 
favored horses. (See e.g. Sauer (1998)). 
We assume the probability weighting functions take the functional form suggested by 
Prelec (1998). 
These are w p e w p q e
p p q
( ) ( )
( ln( )) ( ln( ))
,1 1
1 1
    
         
  
We assume that  0 95.  and = 0.860051 . These parameter values imply over (under) 
weighting of probabilities less (greater) than 0.5 but no probability distortion when the 
objective probability is equal to 0.5 as assumed by Quiggin (1982).  
To illustrate that the individual with RDU preferences can engage in each-way betting 
when the bookmaker odds exhibit a favorite-long shot bias we assume the relationship 
between the objective probability and the odds in the race horse market is well 







  with > 1 
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 We assume that   112.  typical of the estimates obtained in the relationship between the 
expected rate of return per unit staked and the win probability reported in empirical work 
on the favorite long-shot bias. (See e.g. Golec and Tomarkin (1998)).9 
With these assumptions maximum expected utility is obtained from a single bet by 
wagering on a 33/1 long shot. The objective win probability, p, is equal to 19264 10 2. ( )  
and the subjective win probability is equal to 31564 10 2. ( ) . The objective expected return 
to a unit stake win bet on this horse is –0.34503 and the subjective expected return to a 
single unit stake win bet is 7 3189 10 2. ( ) . The optimal stake on the single wager is j= 
2 2179 10 3. ( )  with expected utility of 7 9309 10 5. ( ) .  
The objective probability of the horse placing is q=8 6883 10 2. ( )  with a subjective 
probability of placing (w(1-p)-w(1-p-q)) = 010322. . The place odds are 33/4 implying an 
objective expected return to a unit place bet of –0.19328 and a subjective expected return 
to a unit place bet of 2 4399 10 2. ( ) . Employing 11(a) and 11(b) the optimal win and place 
stakes are equal with s=18481 10 3. ( )  and v=18481 10 3. ( ) . This wager has an expected 
utility of 88319 10 5. ( ).  Consequently the expected utility of optimal each way wager is 
1.136 times greater than the optimal single wager.  
                                                          
9 The relationship between the expected rate of return  and the win probability in 

















  with  around 1.12.   Since p
1+
1+ a
 by substitution we obtain p  .  
(See e.g.Golec and Tomarkin (1998) and Sauer (1998)).
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Section 3 Cumulative Prospect Theory and Win and Place Bets 
Cumulative Prospect Theory of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) is widely regarded as the 
major alternative to expected utility theory in explaining risky choice. In CPT it is 
assumed that from a reference point the representative agent is solely risk-averse over 
gains and solely risk-seeking over losses. The representative individual is also assumed to 
be loss-averse so that losses reduce utility (called expected value in CPT) by more than 
gains of the same amount.  As in RDU it is assumed that the representative agent’s 
subjective probability of an outcome differs from the objective via an inverted s-shaped 
probability weighting function. Small probabilities are assumed over weighted and larger 
ones under weighted. The cumulative weighting process is the same as assumed in RDU 
except the best outcome is weighted first.  It is also assumed that the probability 
weighting function over losses exhibits a smaller degree of probability distortion than the 
probability weighting function over gains. As with RDU the probability distortion can 
result in positive subjective expected returns to single win wagers even though the 
objective expected return are negative.  
For a single wager expected value, EV, in CPT is given by 
EV w p U G w p U L)   ( ) ( ) ( ) (1                                                                               (12)                                                                      
Where U(G) is the value function over gains, U(L) the value function over losses w p ( )  
is the probability weighting function over gains and w p ( )1  the probability weighting 
function over loses.  
To illustrate that a CPT can obtain higher expected value from a win and place wager 
than a single optimal wager we employ logarithmic value functions recently reported by 
Scholten and Read (2014) to provide a parsimonious fit to experimental data. It is also a 
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consistent choice given we employed logarithmic specifications of the utility function in 
the examples in sections 1 and 2.  
Employing log value functions expected value, EV, for the single wager is given by 
  
The optimal stake for the single wager is derived from (13) as 
 
The expected value of a win and place wager is given by  
Where w w p p q w p q    ( ), ( ), ( ) g = w   z =+  1  are the probability weighting 
functions with the decision weights given by the cumulative weighting process assumed 
by Tversky and Kahneman (1992).  Other variables are defined as for RDU.  
We note from (15) that the subjective expected return per unit staked to the win portion 
of  the win and place wager, s ,  is given by s = w(1+a) -g- z,  and the subjective 
return to a unit stake on the  place component by s ,  by s = gb- z.  
The expressions for the optimal stakes s and v derived from (15) are given by  
j
w p ra w p k






( ) ( )
[( ( ) ( )]
1
1
                                                                                     (14)
EV w p r ja w p k j
p p




( ) ln( ) ( ) ln( )





                                                              (13)
Where w ,  w  are the probability weighting functions over gains
 and losses,  j is the stake r,  k and  are positive  constantsand  .   
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The optimal stakes have rather complicated formulae particularly for the place wager v. 
We also observe from (15), (16a) and (16b) that the parameter  is a scaling constant. As 
we vary its value the optimal stake sizes varies but not the expected value of the wager.   
We assume that the probability weighting functions take the same functional form and 
parameter values as assumed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). These are given by 
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= 0.61 and = 0.69.
 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) define loss aversion as the ratio of the value of losses to 
the value of gains for symmetric losses and gains. For logarithmic value functions loss 
aversion has a lower bound of 
k
r
 and an upper bound of k10. Tversky and Kahneman 
                                                          
10 The ratio of the expected value of loss to gain for a symmetric amount, L, the definition 











 .The lower 
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(1992) assumed a value of loss aversion of 2.25. We set k=2 and r=2 which gives a value 
of loss aversion of approximately 1.0 for small stakes. This smaller value of loss aversion 
is more consistent with empirical estimates of loss aversion based on actual wagering 
data. (See e.g. Fees et al (2016))11.  
We provide an example where the punter obtains maximum expected value from a single 




  and the subjective win probability is equal to 31564 10 2. ( ) 12. The objective 
expected return to a unit stake win bet is 0 34503.  and the subjective expected return to a 




. ( )  which 
implies an optimal stake of j  10 .  This optimal single wager has a positive expected 




We now demonstrate that a win and place wager can exhibit greater expected value than 
the optimal single win wager. The win odds and probability of win are the same as 
assumed for the optimal single wager above. The place odds are b  33 5/  and the 
objective place probability q=0.085 with a subjective place probability of 0.1655. The 
objective expected return to a unit stake place bet is –0.2076. From (17) we calculate that 
the optimal win stake in the win and place bet s=10.83 and the place stake v= 1.26 which 
                                                                                                                                                                             






11 We can provide examples of win and place wagering when the individual is loss-
averse. 
12 These values are given from the same favorite-longshot bias employed in the RDU 
calculations. 
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is nearly 20% higher than the optimal single stake. The win and place wager has expected 
value of 36149 10 2. ( )  that is 1.10 times as large as the expected value of the optimal 
single wager.  
The optimal conditions for the win and place stake given by (16a) and (16b) are 
extremely complex. It is interesting that an each-way bet of s=v=8 with the same 
parameter values has positive expected value of 32972 10
2
. ( )
 which is greater than the 
optimal single wager. Although the expected value of the each-way wager  is only 
marginally higher than the expected value of  the optimal single wager it could  be the 
heuristic choice of many punters given by the complexity of the optimal calculation. 
Conclusion 
Each-way bets are popular bets with punters but not explicable in models of risky choice 
where the utility functions of punters are assumed everywhere risk-seeking. In three 
prominent models of risky choice, EU, RDU and CPT the individual’s utility or value 
function exhibit risk aversion. As a consequence individuals described by these models 
may engage in a diversified betting strategy and bet win and place or each-way. We 
provided for the first time some examples where win and place wagers had greater 
expected utility or expected value than an optimal single wager. In the case of RDU and 
CPT the each-way or win and place wagers can readily occur at actuarially unfair win 
odds. 
The conditions for an each-way wager to be optimal at actuarially unfair odds appear 
unlikely to occur in practice except by chance. Both CPT and RDU are descriptors of real 
decision-makers. The attraction of each-way bets maybe that they are quick and easy to 
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compute –a heuristic- to solve an otherwise complex betting strategy13.  From the 
bookmakers perspective they also increase total stake size. 
It was also suggested to me that there may be other good analogies to each-way bets in 
other subject areas where-by you win in case 1 or case 2. A medical example was 
suggested with two "winning" outcomes either "alive after 5 years" (a "win") or "alive 
after at least 1 year" (a "place"). These two outcomes have different odds and values 
since hospitals make bets when they spend £x on the patient hoping for one of the two 
outcomes above (which have pound values in terms of "value of human life" type 
calculations). The treatment cost and the "outcome values" imply the betting odds14. 
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